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DOES FOOD AID REALLY DISCOURAGE FOOD PRODUCTION?
Sandeep Mohapatra, Christopher B. Barrett, Donald L. Snyder, and Basudeb Biswas

ABSTRACT

We examine whether food aid acts as a disincentive to agricultural production in recipient
economies. Since structural deficiencies of markets are a central reason why low-income agrarian
economies receive food aid, we adopt a modeling framework that accommodates market
imperfections. Our nonseparable representative household model highlights the factor market effects
of food aid overlooked in conventional, Schultzian analyses.

DOES FOOD AID REALLY DISCOURAGE FOOD PRODUCTION? l

Food aid has long been criticized as a potential disincentive to recipient country agricultural
production. Schultz argued that food aid can drive down local food prices by increasing the
domestic supply of food, thereby reducing incentives to recipient country food producers and
potentially retarding economic development.

The existence of partial equilibrium price

disincentives of this sort seems widely accepted in the literature (Maxwell and Singer). However,
the theoretical literature relies on implausible Arrow-Debreu models, even though the structural
deficiencies of recipient country markets are a central reason why they receive food aid, and may
have important indirect effects through interrelated markets. This paper therefore revisits this issue
by adopting a model that accommodates market imperfections. While the potential income effects
on demand have caused some to question whether food aid depresses food prices in recipient
economies (Fisher), factor market effects are usually disregarded despite their potential importance.

I A Nonseparable Representative Household Model of the Recipient Economy
Recent advances in the theory of household decision-making emphasize complex
relationships between consumption, labor allocation, and production decisions in peasant households
that consume Sl significant proportion of their own output (Singh et al.; DeJanvry et al.). When
(perhaps household-specific) market failures occur, household utility maximization no longer
reduces production decisions to familiar profit-maximization choice rules. Rather, consumption,
labor allocation, and production decisions become inextricable; these models are often called
"nonseparable" household models. Nonseparable models accommodate selective market failures,

lGraduate research assistant, assistant professor, professor, and professor, respectively. We thank Balraj
Menon, Sanjeev Misra, and Les Reinhom for constructive comments. Barrett's work was supported by a Faculty
Research Grant from the Utah State University Vice-President for Research and by the Utah Agricultural Experiment
Station. Approved as UABS journal paper no. 4990.
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e.g., for labor and/or finance, that condition producers' response to external shocks, such as the
delivery of food aid. A nonseparable representative household model could be useful in depicting
the low-income recipient economy.2
Almost a quarter of the world's population belongs to peasant households in low- and
middle-income countries.

These households are commonly found in villages where poor

transportation and communications infrastructure and low disposable incomes constrain market
participation. Selective labor and financial market failures are consequently common. In principle,
food aid flows to the poorest segments of economies characterized by such significant structural
flaws.
Following DeJanvry et aI., consider a representative household that owns a plot of land and
produces agricultural commodities tradable in the market. Production of these crops employs labor
(Q,) and a purchased input (Qx) on a fixed amount of land (T) to produce cash crops (Qc) and food

(Qf). The household maximizes utility defined over consumption of food (e f ), a manufactured
product traded in the market (em)' and leisure (e,). Assume the utility function is monotonic, twice
differentiable, and concave in each of its arguments. The household faces a technology constraint,
a budget constraint, and a time constraint. Its problem is thus
Max
C,Q
s.t

U (C)

(1)

Z (QIT) = 0
P/Ct~ Pq'Qt+ M
e,+Q, ~ T,

(2)
(3)
(4)

where boldface type denotes a vector, Pc is the subvector of prices associated with tradable
consumption goods, C t is the subvector of tradable consumption goods, P q is the subvector of prices
2Bezuneh et al. use a separable household model in their analysis of food for work schemes in Kenya. That
appears the only other use of household models in this literature.
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associated with production netputs, Qt is the subvector of tradable production netputs, M represents
exo genous income transfers, and T[ is the household' s time endowment. Food aid, A, comprises
part of transfers, i.e., M = A + B, where B represents nonfood aid. Assuming U' > 0, constraints (3)
and (4) will bind. The Lagrangian to this problem may be written as
(5)
where l1J represents the marginal utility of technology improvement, A is the marginal utility of
income, and w can be regarded as the marginal utility of leisure.
The problem's structure implicitly reflects the absence of markets in land and finance . We
also treat labor as nontradable because, in the recipient economies of interest, the vast majority of
labor is engaged on the worker's own farm at a shadow wage that differs from any market wage
(DeJanvry et al.; Jacoby; Skoufias). Representing the shadow price of nontradable labor (C[ and Q[)
as p[* = wlA, and the price of the other tradable goods as P j * = P j , we then have the standard
first-order conditions for constrained utility maximization.

Uj=AP j*
l1JZ.J = -AP*
J

°

Z (QIT) =
P c ' C t =P q 'Qt +M
C[+Q[=T[

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Algebraic manipulation of these conditions yields a generalized profit function, II*(P q *) = P q *'Q,
a system of factor demand and output supply functions , Q = Q(P q*), an expression for household
full income, y* = II* + P[*T[ + M, and a system of demand equations, C = C(P c *, Y*). One can also
derive an equation for the endogenous shadow value of labor, p[* = p[*(P- t*, M), where P- t * is the
shadow price vector, P* , excluding P t*. The incentive effects of food aid come through its influence
on y* and on the price vector, P q *.

4
II The Opposing Effects ofFood Aid on Peasant Producer Households
Not only does food aid increase local food supply, perhaps thereby depressing food prices,
it also can relax balance of payments constraints that may impede import of intermediate goods (e.g.,
fertilizer, machinery) used in agricultural production. 3 Since most low-income agrarian nations
import a substantial portion of commercial agricultural inputs, relaxing the balance of payments
constraint-the macroeconomic analog to the representative household's budget constraint-may
stimulate food production in recipient economies. Just as increased supply of food is expected to
reduce the domestic market price of food, p[, so would increased hard currency availability increase
the local supply of commercial inputs, reducing P x •
Given the above model, the output response of food to an increase in food aid is
BQj dPj

BQj

dP/

BQj dP x

(11)

- - " - +--" - - +--"-BPj dA BP * dA
BPx dA
z

The first term on the right-hand side of (11) is the Schultzian negative partial equilibrium
supply response, but two additional factor market effects must be considered. The third term will
be positive if food aid permits additional intermediate imports and reduces their domestic price. The
output

respon~e

to food aid is thus analytically ambiguous because of the opposing partial

equilibrium effects in product and factor markets. This ambiguity is reinforced by the labor
allocation incentive effects of food aid shown in the second term of (11).
Although BQ[IBPt is unambiguously negative by the convexity of the profit function, food
aid has ambiguous effects on the shadow wage, as is evident by totally differentiating (10) and the

3While, in principle, food aid is to be fully "additional" to commercial food purchases, the empirical evidence
is strong that food aid at least partly substitutes for commercial imports (Maxwell and Singer; von Braun and
Huddleston).
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expression for household full income, Y* , then rearranging terms (see the appendix for details). The
response of the shadow wage to food aid depends on the induced fall in P f' on the one hand, and the
increase in leisure demand stimulated by the income transfer and by the profit effect of induced
reduction in Px ' on the other. This is shown in expression (12).

dP /*

(12)

Q + ~

aQ/

dA

ac/

ac/

an

- _ + __ + _ 0 _ ap * ap * aY ap *
/

/

(13)

aPj [ac/ + aQ/ + ac/ an
aA aPj aPj ay aPj
°

where Q

~

/

=

ac/
ay

[1 + an

apx

(14)
°

dP

x]

dA

The denominator of (12) is unambiguously negative given a convex profit function. As reflected
in (13), the first term in the numerator, Q, is the sum of three terms multiplied by the (assumed)
negative effect of food aid on food prices. The first term is positive if food and leisure are gross
substitutes. The second term is the positive partial response of labor supply to output price. The
third term represents the income effect on the consumption of leisure due to change in P f and is
positive if the hpusehold is a net seller of food. Thus, for net food sellers for whom leisure and food
are gross substitutes, Q is unambiguously negative. The second term in the numerator,

~,

contains

two terms. The first is simply the positive marginal income effect on leisure consumption from an
extra monetary unit of transfer due to food aid. The second is the positive profit effect of (assumed)
reduced input prices, Px , due to food aid' s salutary effects on the balance of payments. The shadow
wage effects of food aid are thus likewise ambiguous, reflecting the broader juxtaposition of product
market disincentives and factor market incentives to food production.
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Moreover, a careful study of equations (11) and (12) reveals that it is not possible to predict
easily whether factor market or product market effects will dominate. The balance of payments
effects that stimulate output by reducing purchased input prices simultaneously exert upward
pressure on the shadow wage (through

~) ,

thereby discouraging agricultural employment at the

margin. Conversely, the product market disincentive effects to food production exert downward
pressure on the shadow wage (through Q), inducing countervailing employment effects at the
margin. Schultz's prediction becomes analytically ambiguous once one considers the richness of
incomplete markets and nonseparable household decision-making in poor agrarian economies. The
economic effects of food aid are fundamentally an empirical question, one warranting further
research.

III Conclusion
This paper revisits the long-standing debate concerning effect of food aid on the incentives
to food production in recipient economies. We explore the implications of nonseparable household
decisions caused by widespread nonparticipation in labor, land, and financial markets, which
characterizes the low-income, agrarian, food recipient economies in which this issue is of greatest
concern. The ~lassic Schultzian findings do not hold under our more general approach.
Our model demonstrates analytically common anecdotal accounts (Maxwell and Singer):
because food aid is not wholly additional (i.e., it is to some degree a substitute for commercial food
imports), relaxing recipients' balance of payments constraints may stimulate factor employment even
as food prices fall in product markets. The classic theoretical work on food aid (Schultz; Fisher) and
subsequent modeling efforts essentially ignore these effects. Much as it is preferable to investigate
the incentive effects of trade and exchange rate policies by studying effective rates of protection
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(which consider both factor and product market effects) rather than nominal protection coefficients
(which are based only on product prices), so too is it important to emphasize the multiple,
countervailing impacts of food aid across the full range of markets in which low-income food
producers operate. Ascertaining the economic effects of food aid thus fundamentally requires
empirical study.
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Appendix

Begin with equation (10) and the expression for household full income derived from the
first-order conditions (6)-(10).

(ii)

y*

=

A + B + II*+ P)*T)

N ext, totally differentiate both expressions.

Noting that

substitute (v) into (iv) and rearrange terms

Now substitute (vii) into (iii) and rearrange terms

Divide through both sides to get
dP I*

Q+~

(12)

10
(13)

~

ac,
=ay

an dPx
1+-°apx dA

(14)

